Default

Está no Zero Hedge uma análise recomendável a um paper do FMI entitulado Default in Today's Advanced Economies: Unnecessary, Undesirable, and Unlikely.

Deixo apenas aqui a conclusão mas sugiro que sigam o link porque vale a pena ler, pelo menos, a refutação dos 3 pontos enunciados no título do paper.

Sovereign default depends on many factors – initial conditions, the country’s external environment, economic, social and political institutions and its policies. In the case of Greece, this set of circumstances suggests that default (by which we mean any restructuring with maturity lengthening or an NPV haircut) is not just a distinct possibility, but a high probability event. The size of the required adjustment needed just to stabilise the burden of public debt, the eventual size of the burden of interest payments and the lack of a strong social and political consensus on domestic burden sharing that might make the extreme fiscal austerity manageable, make it unlikely, in our view, that the Greek sovereign will only impose fiscal adjustment costs on its citizens. Instead, we expect that the country’s creditors will be invited to share the burden.

[...]

Nothing is absolutely certain in human affairs. It is possible that Greece succeeds in the economic, political and social transformations that would permit it to get out of its current predicament without a sovereign default. But in our view, the blanket statement that sovereign default in today’s AEs is unnecessary, undesirable, and unlikely represents the triumph of dogma over evidence and logic.